By Gustavo Rodríguez
Translated by Todd Prane
[From Amor y Rabia Vol. 1, No. 3.
Analysis just prior to the Aug. 21 elections in México]
Stuck to the patterns of the six-year presidential term, Sedena (the Secretariat of National Defense) is "modernizing" and raising itself to the "heights of the First World."
Although they tried to discretely buy the anti-insurrection vehicles, Blackhawk helicopters, armored artillery carriers, and arms from the US (the great supplier in these cases), the acquisition was quickly made public. The Secretariat of Defense, by m eans of a communiqué published in several national and North American newspapers, assured us that they were only fulfilling the "National Development Plan 1989-1994," which established "the need for the armed forces to modernize, for which they require co nstant perfection of the organization, the equipment, and military capacity."
In the same Sedena communiqué, they offer figures and give specifications with the intent of quieting the people's fear, or rather, with the intent of disguising the real intentions of the soldiers in this electoral year of fierce political opposition.
They specified that from May 13-15, customs in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas received 260 Hummer vehicles and 36 Chrysler Ram Charger trucks. They add that "the Hummer vehicles have come to substitute for the traditional Jeeps and Dodge Power Wagons, which date back between 1962 and 1970."
The purpose of presenting these small figures, and of showing equipment which can be used for "aiding the population in cases of disaster," is to perform a huge make-up job on an army that, on previous occasions (Oct. 2, 1968, to cite an example), has demonstrated its anti-democratic calling and its potential danger.
However, according to information offered by the workers at the Pantaco de Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México [National Mexican Railroad] station to the capital city newspaper La Jornada (1), Sedena has been using the railroads to transport military eq uipment since the beginning of April. They explained that they don't have an exact list of the material that has been imported because "many of the orders and permits have only been issued verbally, and therefore are not archived."
The Pantaco railroad workers also reported that between Friday, Apr. 13 and Sunday, Apr. 15, an "undetermined number of military vehicles" was received at that terminal. (Sedena assures us that those were the 260 Hummer vehicles and 36 Ram Charger truc ks.) The workers corroborated that the units were shipped from Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, that they were unloaded on Friday at dawn, and that from there they were taken to Campo Marte and Campo Militar Número 1. According to the report, the transportation of the military vehicles was carried out on 24 three-level Piggy Black brand platforms, which were heavily guarded.
When the goods arrived in Mexico City, the railway workers continued, almost 10 Sedena trucks were posted at the exit to Ceylán Avenue, normally a lightly traveled street, and they waited to unload them in special units. According to the workers' repor t in La Jornada, "the vehicles came with extra guards, which doesn't make sense, if they were just coming to substitute for older vehicles, and not to provoke, or avoid problems."
In an article published on Apr. 27 in the San Antonio Express News, reporters John MacCormack and Carmina Danini wrote that the first evidence of the purchase of military equipment by Sedena was reported at the beginning of the month in the New Orleans Times. John Kelly, director of the Textron Company, told those reporters that the Mexican government had bought 18 vehicles from his firm at a cost of $9 million (N$30 million). Another six similar vehicles were acquired by the Mexican Government from th e Custon Armoring Company.
On Thursday, Apr. 28, it was confirmed by Subsecretary for Foreign Relations Andrés Rozental that the acquisition of the armored vehicles was paid for by the Secretariat of Defense. Shortly thereafter, on Friday the 29th, Sedena announced in a press re lease the purchase of 24 anti-insurrection tanks from the US.
This purchase demonstrated the intentions of the federal government to use army soldiers as police forces in the eventual case of popular disturbances caused by the generalized widespread discontent. According to military sources consulted by the newsw eekly Proceso (2), Sedena personnel are currently training in the use of this anti-riot equipment. In the same article, Proceso reports that: "It is routine to see maneuvers of anti-riot vehicles in Campo Militar Número 1. These can even be seen from the street, through door number eight of the Campo near the Toreo de Cuatro Caminos." They describe the soldiers, now serving the functions of military police, as they throw stones and sticks at each other, which are repelled by protective shields. They retur n the attack with gas grenades, which previously were not used. Proceso also reports that military troops are being organized into special units concentrated at the Mexican Air Force Base at Santa Lucía, in the State of México. They also report the purcha se of Dina Busses designed to transport anti-riot troops. These vehicles "have five doors on each side that can open simultaneously, with a capacity of transporting up to 50 troops."
By using the Federal Army as "police," the government, that is to say, the president, is violating Article 129 of the Constitution. That article declares that "In times of peace, no military authority can exercise functions other than those which have a direct connection to military discipline..." By the fact that the presidency has not recognized the Zapatista Army as a belligerent force, and due to the lack of a declaration of war by the executive, or an official suspension of rights, the federal arm y cannot be used in Chiapas (where the state has been impeding free travel, monitoring vehicles and travelers, seizing gasoline and other goods and consumables, and carrying out searches in houses and schools without judicial order) or in other states of the Federation and in Mexico City (where they are preparing to repress possible uprisings). To the contrary, they are violating Article 129 of the Constitution.
It is true that in Article 89, under the "powers and obligations of the president," the president is given the power to "oversee the whole of the permanent army, that is, the land army, the sea forces and the air forces, for the security of the country and defense from attacks from outside the Federation." But this is only possible, according to Article 129, in time of war; that is to say, when a suspension of rights is declared or a declaration of war is issued.
In order to follow the Constitution, Salinas, rather than resorting to having the army carry out "anti-riot" work, pursue "drug traffickers," and carry out "rescues," should use the National Guard, according to what is stipulated in Article 73 of the C onstitution. In this sense, he should, in an "emergency situation," appeal to the National Guard. But the National Guard is a thing of the past. It existed long ago and was used to defend the Federative system. It was used in Zacatecas by Francisco García to confront the centralist government of Santa Anna; it was also used by Benito Juárez to combat the French occupation; but specifically, with the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, the dangers posed to a centralist government by a "parallel army" were reali zed. Since then, the National Guard has only existed in the Constitution, in addition to what is stipulated in the Law of Obligatory Military Service, which says that all men between the ages of 40 and 45 form part of it as well; this is the only referenc e that remains to the National Guard.
While Sedena tries to justify its acquisitions within the "National Development Plan 1989-1994," in its administrative summary for 1994 in the Budget of the Central Public Administration, we find detailed figures on the increase in the budget of Sedena : 18.8% and 13% in its nominal and real spending, respectively. It is one of the few entities of the federal government that received an increase this year, and its budget stands at N$62,377,200,000 (US$20 billion) this year.
With this financial state, Sedena has increased its staff, from 157,010 in 1993 to 162,048 currently. Its "permanent" personnel stands at 162,062 people.
The "War on Drugs" is not a new theme. It has been used by Yankee imperialists to justify invasions, occupations, military advisors, the sale of weapons and sophisticated military equipment, and the installation of gringo military bases in Central and South American territory. The examples are many: the invasion of Panama, the presence of US warships on the coast of Colombia, the military advisors to the Bolivian and Ecuadorian armies, the military base in Santa Lucía in Peru, and so on.
Many governments in Central and South America (Guatemala, Peru, etc.) have used this beautiful propagandistic slogan to allay the "people's worries" in the anti-insurgent and anti-guerrilla struggle, and México has not been an exception.
If we remember the statements released by Sedena in Oct. of 1993, the confrontations experienced by the federal army in Chiapas were not with combatants of the EZLN, but rather with "presumed drug traffickers, contraband traffickers, and illegal cutter s of wood." [Cutting down trees is not permitted in many of the forests in Chiapas.] After the Zapatista offensive on Jan. 1, this could not be hidden from the public any longer. In the same way, statements from the Sedena continue to appear in Mexico Cit y newspapers, reporting that the military presence in various states of the country is "only to combat drug trafficking." But it is noteworthy that more than 25% of soldiers are involved in the so-called "War Against Drugs." Last year the Federal Army use d 43,410 soldiers (generals, officers and troops), which is to say one fourth of all soldiers in the Sedena, to "fight drugs." Through different "anti-drug" operations, such as the "Condor Plan," in which 7,500 soldiers participated, the country has been militarizing.
The existence of a "Fuerza Marte" with "elite" training is also known. This is a "special forces" unit of 3,000 soldiers who were deployed in the states of Durango, Sinaloa and Chihuahua.
The presence of the Fuerza Marte was known in the high Sierra Tarahumara and near the towns of Pericos, in the section of the Ejido Borigame, when a military squadron from the "fuerza" (stationed in Bodiraguato, state of Sinaloa) was fired upon by a gr oup headed by Angel "el Tohui" (the child of Tarahumara) and his brother Artemio Fontes. This confrontation took place on Friday, Apr. 22, while a "secret" meeting took place between officials from the US Pentagon and their Mexican counterparts. This meet ing took place in the utmost secrecy on the former Hacienda of Gertrúdis, now the Francisco Villa military zone. Officially, there was no information available about the meeting, or the presence of the North American officials, or on the meeting's discuss ion topics. However, the presence of federal soldiers in Roberto Fierro airport, in the capital of Chihuahua, while the meetings were carried out, was known. The soldiers were guarding three Boeing 747s registered in the US.
Armed conflicts were also confirmed in Chihuahua, in the area of Guadalupe y Calvo, on Apr. 24 and 25. During the confrontation on Monday, Apr. 25, one of the alleged drug traffickers was killed in the confusion. According to the Mexican troops' versio n, the "drug traffickers" attacked them, and one of them, a young man by the name of Martín Jesús Saénz Rodríguez, fell down an 800m (2600 ft) cliff, in the area of "the Peach Table," about two hours away from the county seat, Guadalupe y Calvo.
Later, a 15-year-old who wished only to be identified as "Martín," told The Chihuahua newspaper on Apr. 29 that, "before these events, he and Martín Jesús were getting ready to eat when they were surprised by three soldiers, one of whom began to fire w ithout any apparent motive." He added that his friend was shot in the head and that he was grazed by a bullet on his right knee. Martín continued, "I hid among the pines and hills and was able to reach Guadalupe y Calvo." This forced the investigating age nt, Rosario Villalobos, to carry out "in-depth investigations" which, according to the ministry, revealed a 9 mm pistol on Martín Jesús Saénz's chest, and a hat with a hole in it 10m (33 ft) away. Villalobos also found tracks indicating that something had been "dragged."
In spite of the evidence of similar facts, which prove the existence of a military presence in various states of the country, and, above all, the intensification of this presence since Jan. 1, Sedena, by means of a press release at the beginning of Jun e, indicated that the "supposed militarization" was part of "Operación Nacional II-94" (National Operation II-94), and that said operation would be carried out from June 24 on, as part of the battle against drug trafficking. That raises the question: Were the events that occurred before that date not part of the war against drugs? Then who were they fighting?
The same press release goes on in detail that the Defense Ministry, through the operation, sent more than 9,000 troops and 464 land vehicles, 14 helicopters, and air force planes, "particularly" to the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Nay arit, Jalisco, Michoacán, Guerrero and Oaxaca. It goes on to say that they seized 268 firearms, seven land vehicles, and 39 alleged drug traffickers, while killing seven people in the state of Durango.
In the middle of this climate of political violence, repression, and iron-fistedness, the ruling class collapses quickly. Within the party-dictatorship (or the "Party of the State," as the politicologists like to say) fear and mistrust are sharpening c areers (especially after the death of Colosio), and those who change sides keep up to date on the order of the day. Meanwhile, popular discontent, generalized resistance, the take-overs of town halls, municipal presidencies, police stations, etc., bank ex propriations, and kidnappings are increasing. All of this, without a doubt, affects the ruling classes, who, in the face of this insecurity, decide to take all of their dividends out of the country. Foreign investment slows, and the stock market doesn't r ecover from its up-and-down cycle. In the face of this situation, Salinas sees his business—that is, his development project, NAFTA—threatened, and to save it he uses dollars from the national reserves and stops the rise of interest rates. In this way, to guarantee "national security," he creates a new monster: the Coordinación de Seguridad Pública de la Nación (Coordination of Public Security of the Nation—CSPN), and appoints Arsenio Farell to head it, who has until now served as the Secretary of Prevent ative Social Work, leaving in his wake the almost complete destruction of the independent workers movement.
Salinas's new creation manifests itself, once again, within the personal style that has characterized his presidency: the IRON FIST, violating the Constitution anew, and guaranteeing the "order" that preserves dictatorships. This "coordination" reminds us of Stalin's KGB, the Nazi Gestapo, in the bloody days of history, or, more recent, it evokes images of the Dina of Pinochet, the Dincote of his neoliberal colleague Fujimori, or the G-2 of Castro.
Even though the federal army, by means of their "highest leader," Secretary of National Defense Antonio Riviello Bazán, indicated to the press that they will not be involved in the decisions of the Coordination of National Security, it is well-known th at [now ex-] President Salinas intends to group all of the repressive bodies (judicial police, federal police, the army, etc.) into this coordination in order to get "a better job done": Repression.
The latest news of the coordination is that it is involved in a plan to "counteract violence in the country" by means of "surveillance of the highways." They will have at their disposal the highest level of technology, using sophisticated helicopters c onnected via satellite. They will also be well outfitted with armaments.